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Introduction
During the period in which Classical Economics had been a dominant school in economics, it had been a neglected issue that political institutions could affect economic policies. Until the 1960s, sciences of politics and economics had different lines of research. Political scientists had produced normative theories without using any economic tools and concepts, while economists were studying with mathematical tools without trying to understand the effect of political institutions on the economy. After 1960s, economists have been searching for the interaction between politics and macroeconomics. When constructing theoretical models usually depended on utility maximization, they accept voters and governments as economic agents maximizing their individual utilities. Thus, as a sub-discipline of political economics "New Political Economics" has been emerged. Since the last three decades, there have been many studies in this line of research. In these studies, political institutions have not been accepted as exogenous variables to macroeconomic policies. On the contrary, they have been considered as endogenously determined by the macroeconomic policies.
Since 1970s, new macroeconomic approaches which take into account, for example, the importance of "credibility problem" (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) , the possible effects of general elections ("Political Business Cycles" by Nordhaus, 1975 and "Partisan Theory" by Hibbs, 1977) in applying macroeconomic policies have been developed 1 , 2 , 3 .
Nordhaus and Hibbs' models are the pioneer works of PBC literature which emphasizes the link between political institutions and macroeconomic policies. The main point in both studies is that, the incumbent government manipulates the economy to have the maximum number of votes to be re-elected, and this manipulation in turn causes the economy to fluctuate around its long-run path. A political business cycle is therefore the economy's fluctuation around its long-run behaviour generated by the political system 4 . In other words, the PBC literature studies how interest groups and political pressures within a country influence its macroeconomic performance.
Based on the second classification, there have been opportunistic and partisan theories including different approaches on the behaviour of governments. Nordhaus' theory depends on a Downsian approach. As discussed by Downs, each politician prefers to be in office rather than out of office 6 . Indeed, the idea that political parties apply policies only to win elections, not for political reasons, first occured by Schumpeter 7 . After 15 years, Downs with 'median voter theorem' made it theoretical based by Olters 8 . Downs' study has been accepted as a classical reference about opportunistic PBC models by Alesina et al. 9 .
Nordhaus discusses that, in a democracy, governments fight against inflation and unemployment to compete with the other parties before elections. Nordhaus' model is a dynamic optimization model applying maximization criteria. 'Phillips Curve', including a trade off mechanism between unemployment and inflation rates and 'Voting function', are the most important components of the model 10 . According to his theory with myopic voters assumption, governments try to convince voters by creating rapid economic growth and slow growth of unemployment rate with monetary and financial policies which trigger aggregate demand. Inflationary results of these policies occur with a lag. After winning elections, tight policies are applied to decrease inflation.
On the other part, Hibbs argues that, left and right wing parties have different objectives to win elections. Left-wing parties are more interested in unemployment and growth, while right-wing parties are more concerned with inflation.
PBC literature, by the pioneered works of Nordhaus and Hibbs, has not been as attractive as it has been since the 1990s. By New Classical second generation versions of PBC theories with 'Rational Expectations' assumption in the 1990s, the literature has become one of the most popular lines of research in political macroeconomics. Alesina developed 'Rational Partisan Theory' following Hibbs' 'Partisan Theory', Persson and Tabellini developed 'Rational PBC' following Nordhaus' PBC theory with 'Rational Expectations' assumption. Thus, second generation models emerged 11 , 12 , 13 .
Following the above mentioned studies, since the mid-seventies political economists have tried to explain the interaction between political and macroeconomic 6 A. Downs (1957) It is important to determine which policy instruments could have been used to produce PBC in the economy, in order to prevent the occurrence of PBC in the future. By eliminating PBC from economic variables, macroeconomic efficiency and stabilization in the countries can be improved. The objective of the paper is to determine which policy instruments that could have been used to produce PBC in Turkey in the last decades. Did incumbent governments try to manipulate fiscal and monetary policy instruments so as to get re-elected and stay in office in Turkey? To find an answer to this question, some monetary, finance policy data are regressed and agricultural policies are analyzed.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the second part, there are some explanations about the methods applied in the empirical analysis of the Turkish case for PBC theory in monetary, fiscal and agricultural policies. The estimation results of the equations and interpretations of the comparative tables are discussed in the third part. And the study concludes with the fourth section.
Methodology
Autoregressions, comparative tables and figures are used to analyze PBC in several data. First, specification of the empirical tests are mentioned and then, comparative tables and figures are presented below.
Specification of Empirical Tests
The simplest and most direct way of testing the various economic theories is to run regressions of time-series data (Alesina et al., 1997) .
Many economic theories have natural representations as stochastic difference equations. It is one of the most convenience way of modelling dynamic economic processes. Linear difference equations underly much of the theory of time-series econometrics. Especially one important methodology is Box-Jenkins (1976) methodology for estimating time-series models of the form:
where yt is a certain variable on day t and εt is a random disturbance term that has an expected value of zero.
Such models are called autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) time series models (Enders, 1995) .
Based on the linear difference equations of time-series econometrics as mentioned above, to analyze PBC theory on the Turkish monetary and fiscal policy data, Alesina et al. (1992) 's methodology is applied. In this method, different lag lengths of the dependent variables and election dummies are used as explanatory variables. Here in this study, structural break dummies are also included as explanatory variables to the regressions. In the appendix B, some explanations about these dummy variables are provided.
Thus, general representation of the models used in this study can be defined in the following form:
where mt is the annual growth rate of the data defined as: m t = ((RM1 t -RM1 t-4 )/RM1 t-4 ) (100) where RM1 is the level of the real variables which are provided in the appendix C and K t is the dummy variable (or variables) appropriate for the related model.
Data
Annual, quarterly and monthly data without seasonally adjustment are used throughout the study. Periods analyzed for each data are changing. For monetary policy analysis, the periods are longer. All data and the related periods analyzed are provided in the appendix A.
Election Dummy Variables and Structural Break Dummies
To determine the effects of elections on the related data, dummy variables are included in the regressions. 'Composite election dummy' that takes a value of one for each election year and 'special election dummy' that takes a value of one for only the special election year are used.
In addition to political dummies, structural break dummies for eliminating the effects of the structural break and external economic shocks from the data are included in the regressions. Conventional approach to structural breaks was that, the effects of external shocks to the economic data would be diminishing and in the long run, data would be stationary. However, Nelson and Plosser has changed this point of view 16 . They found structural breaks in 13 of 14 macroeconomic series. Perron, Zivot and Andrews took attention to the possible misleading effects of structural breaks through the unit root tests 17 . It is a controversial subject whether structural breaks should be taken as exogenous variable or should be determined internally as Perron, ivot and Andrews respectively.
In this study Perron's methodology is adopted and structural breaks are taken as exogenous variables. The related structural break dummy variables are included in all unit root tests and election regressions.
Stationarity Tests
Since all of the series are seasonally unadjusted, possible seasonal unit roots are investigated. The results of the stationarity tests are provided in the appendix D 18 .. Perron, P. (1989) , "The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis, Econometrica, 57, 1361-1401; Zivot, E. and Andrews, D. (1992) , "Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock and the Unit Root Hypothesis, Journal of Business and Economics Statistics, 10, 251-270. 18 After the study of Nelson and Plosser (1982) , there have been arguments about dynamic properties of macroeconomic and financial time series. Stochastic processes may not be stationary and contain unit root problem. In this situation, these processes can not be evaluated by standard statistics theorem. That is why, macroeconomic series should pass through stationarity tests. This is a standard process in econometrics.
For analyzing unit root problem, Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test is applied in this paper. In ADF tests, under mentioned regression is applied to each data analyzed. ∆y t = a 0 + γ y t -1 + a 2 τ + ∑ i=2 p β i y t -i+1 + Dz + ε t (3) where ∆y t is the first difference of yt, and Dz is structural break and external shock dummy variable 19 .
On Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation results, hypothesis below are tested: H 0 : γ= 0 ({y t } process contains unit root problem, series is non-stationary). H 1 : γ < 1 ({y t } process does not contains unit root, series is stationary).
In determining the number of lags in the ADF regressions, Weber (2001)'s No Autocorrelation (NAC) method is adopted. For the NAC, autocorrelation up to order four in the residuals of the ADF regression is tested using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. K is set at the smallest value such that the LM test fails to reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 0.10 level of significance.
According to the ADF regressions' results, the series in levels are non-stationary but their annual growth rates are stationary. That is why annual growth rates of the variables are included in the models.
Estimation Results and Implications
For the lag length selection in the autoregressions, Campbell and Perron's 'General to Specific Criteria (GSC)' is chosen 20 , 21 . Based on this criteria, regressions in the most general form with maximum lag length, structural break and external shock dummies are estimated first and then the final specific forms of the regressions without residual autocorrelation are reached 22 , 23 , 24 . 19 From D80, D89, D94 or D98 dummies, appropriate ones for the related period analyzed in the regression dummies are included in the ADF regressions.
20
In their broad overview of the literature on unit root econometrics, Campbell and Perron claimed "GSC" as an appropriate procedure for setting the lag length in ADF regressions. For the importance of structural breaks in unit root tests' reliability, see Perron (1989) , Zivot and Andrews (1992) .
23
Maximum lag length is taken according to the Perron (1989) , Zivot and Andrews (1992) , Hall (1994) as kmax= 12 for quarterly data and kmax= 24 for monthly data as mentioned in Weber (2001) . 24 For the importance of structural breaks in unit root tests' reliability, see Perron (1989) , Zivot and Andrews (1992) .
Estimation results by OLS are reported in Table 3 .1-6, Table 3 .2.1-3 and Table  3 .3. Absolute t-ratio for each estimated coefficient is defined as t i . R 2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. SE is the standard error of the regression. LM is the 'Lagrange Multiplier test' for residual autocorrelation up to order four. ARCH is the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals is tested by Jarque Bera statistics (JB).
Evidence of PBC Theory in Monetary Policies
The economic data on the PBC analysis in the Turkish monetary policies during the related period are quarterly time-series data of targeted variables by CBRT (CBRT balance sheet size, net domestic assets and monetary base), some other monetary data such as currecy issued and M1, and also public sector credits extended by CBRT. The political data are the election dates. Table 3 .1 reports the results of the dynamic OLS regressions. The specific forms of equations above are regressed for each pairs of the election dummies such as before election dummies and after election dummies provided in Table E1 -E6, appendix E. The signs of the coefficients are as expected apriori. According to the t-values of the election dummies, it can be concluded that there have been no PBC in the targeted variables of the monetary policy during the period analyzed 25 . Indeed, the fifth model above for Grrealndaq is out of consideration because of its low R2 value. However, based on the line graph of Grrealndaq following a stable path, it can be concluded that CBRT did not allow PBC occurrence in the Realndaq (see appendix F).
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In Turkey, after institutional reforms realized in the 1980s, CBRT's monetary policy tools has been diversified. Before 1980, currency issued, which is an important percentage of CBRT balance sheet size, had been used as a monetary indicator for CBRT's monetary policies. After 1980, reserve money, monetary base, central bank money, M series (M1, M2, M2Y, M3Y) have been used as monetary indicators (Öztürk, 1992) . The first monetary programme of CBRT "1990 Monetary Programme" and the second one "1992 Monetary Programme" determine monetary indicators of CBRT monetary policies as follows: Net Domestic Assets, Sum of Domestic Liabilities, CBRT Balance Sheet Size, Central Bank Money (Ersel and Öztürk, 1992) .
Although there have been no PBC in the targeted variables, there has been some evidence of PBC on the currency issued, M1 and public sector credits data. For example, ceteris paribus, based on the t-values and coefficients of composite dummy variables in the Tables E.2-3 , five -six quarters before elections, annual growth rates of currency issued and M1 had been almost four -six percent higher than those of other periods.
Evidence of PBC in Finance Policies
In testing PBC theory in the Turkish finance policies from the late 1980s to the end of 2000, monthly time-series data of growth rate of monthly public expenditures, real public personnel expenditures, real tax revenues are regressed. The results of the equations are provided below. 
Growth rate of monthly real tax revenues (Grrealtr)
Grrealtr = 0.87 + 0.98 Grrealtr(-1) -0.23 Grrealtr(-2) + 0.11 Grrealtr(-6) -0.52 Grrealtr(-12) + 0.33 Grrealtr(-13) + 0.11 Grrealtr(-18) + 0.21 Grrealtr(-23) -0.29 Grrealtr(-24) + 3.61 D89 -25.08 D94 -3.18 Db6 -0.85 Da6 t 1 = 0.57, t 2 = 14.27, t 3 = -3.42, t 4 = 2.42, t 5 = 6.18, t 6 = 3.81, t 7 = 2.07, t 8 = 2.62, t 9 = -3.63, t 10 = 2.26, t 11 = -4.84, t 12 = -2.35, t 13 = -0.67 According to the estimation results of the finance policy equations, except tax revenue equations, the signs of the coefficients and t-values of election dummies are not as expected apriori. It can be concluded that, there had been no PBC on Grrealpe and Grrealppe during the 1987-2000 period. However, the coefficients and t-values of election dummies of the tax revenue model are as expected and there had been PBC as suggested by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 26 . They argue that, before elections, growth rate of the real tax revenues are lowered than those of non-election years and after elections, governments increase tax rates to gain more tax revenues. In accordance with the argument above, in Turkey during the 1988-2000 period, ceteris paribus, before election years growth rates of tax revenues had been decreased substantially and after election years, they had been increased considerably. The coefficients and t-values of dummies are provided in the Tables E12-13 in the appendix E.
In addition to the regression analysis, a figure which has a comparison between the series of 'the annual growth rate of public personnel expenditures per-person in SEEs (Grppe)' and 'annual inflation rate (inflation)' is presented below. 
. Relationship between Inflation and Grppe
As can be observed from the Figure 3 .1, there had been substantial growth rates which exceed inflation rate in 1987 , 1991 elections. In 1991 elections, values of the series also circulated above the average of the series. It can be concluded from the data that there had been PBC in public personnel expenditures of SEEs in the period of 1980-2001.
Evidence of PBC in Agricultural Policies
CBRT had extended agricultural credits before 1991. In testing the PBC theory on agricultural policies, the series of growth rate of agricultural credits which had been extended by CBRT in the 1977-1991 period are regressed. In addition to the regression analysis, agricultural credits extended by ABRT in the 1965-1999 period, and the relationship between the announcement dates of some subsidized agricultural product prices declared by governments and general election dates are analyzed in terms of PBC theory by comparative tables in this sub-section. According to the estimation results of the regression in Table 3 .3, there had been PBC especially before election years in the Grreealacq series. Ceteris paribus, one quarter before election date, the growth rate of the credits had been 76.42 percent more than those of non-election terms. For the other t-values and coefficients of the specific election year dummies see Table E7 provided in the appendix E. There is also clear evidence of PBC on the specific election dummies of 1987 and 1991 elections. Based on the values provided by Table 3 .4, GRAC exceeds π during the five (1969, 1973, 1983, 1991, 1995) of the seven election years. In 1973 In , 1983 In , 1991 and 1995 elections, GRAC exceeds both π , Avnonel and average of the series. According to the Table 3 .5, some agricultural products' subsidized prices had been announced only a few months before general election dates except the year 1987. , 1923-1998", (2001) Avnonel: Average of non-election years before the election year π : Annual inflation ratio *** : GRAP exceeds π, Avnonel and average of the series ** : GRAP exceeds two of π, Avnonel or average of the series * : GRAP exceeds one of π, Avnonel or average of the series years characterized in bold letters are the election years.
According to the Table 3 .6, GRAP of many agricultural products exceeds both π, Avnonel and average of the series during or before the election year.
Conclusions
Although the pioneered works of the PBC literature had been developed in the late 1970s as a branch of New Political Economics, the PBC theories have been a popular line of research in the 1990s'. Since it is now a widely accepted issue that political institutions can not be excluded from the analysis of macroeconomic policies, possible effects of political institutions on macroeconomic policies has been researched in several countries.
Following the PBC literature in this paper, possible effects of general elections on the monetary and finance policies and agricultural policies during the last decades in the Turkish economy are investigated. The summary of the results of the analysis are as follows. While CBRT has not allowed PBC occurrence on the targeted variables, there has been some evidence of PBC on some monetary data such as currency issued and M1. In addition, before 1998, CBRT had to extend some public sector credits. Due to the high legal ceilings, CBRT had not been able to limit these credits during the related period. So, there has been clear evidence of PBC on the public sector credits data. After 1998, CBRT has never extended any credits to the public sector. This issue is strictly determined in the CBRT Law No. 1211 which was changed in 25th of April, 2001 with Law no. 4651. According to the changes in the CBRT Law, CBRT will never extend public credits. Since,the results reached in this paper are in favour of PBC theory, it seems an appropriate application for CBRT to become independent.
There has been some evidence of PBC in the finance policies, especially for tax revenues in the 1988-2000 period. Based on the regression results, it can be concluded that, before election years, growth rates of tax revenues had been decreased substantially, and after elections they had been increased considerably in the period analyzed.
Based on the analysis of the agricultural policies, it is determined that, some opportunistic policies had been occurred over the period of 1964-1998 in Turkey. Annual agricultural credits extended by ABRT had been increased substantially before election years. Prices of some subsidized agricultural products had been announced just a few months before the election dates. Annual growth rates of the subsidized agricultural products' prices had been realized higher than those of non-election years before and in the election years. The series of the growth rate of agricultural credits extended by CBRT had followed a similar PBC during the 1977-1991 period. Ceteris paribus, the growth rates of real agricultural credits by CBRT before election years had been higher than those of non-election periods. After 1991, CBRT has never extended agricultural credits.
It is important to determine which policy instruments could have been used to produce PBC in the Turkish economy, in order to prevent the occurrence of PBC in the future. In this study, some policy instruments that could have been used to produce PBC are researched and what can be done to prevent the occurrence of PBC is left for the future work. Agricultural credits extended by ABRT (1965 ABRT ( -1998 .
General Election Dates in Turkey:
1965 -October 10, 1965 1969 -October 12, 1969 1973 -October 14, 1973 1977 -June 5, 1977 1980 -September 12, 1980 1983 -November 6, 1983 1987 -October 29, 1987 1991 -October 20, 1991 1995 -December 24, 1995 -April 18, 1999 1. k, is the number of lags in ADF regressions. In lag length selection, Weber's No Autocorrelation (NAC) method is applied.
2. Column A, B and C give the t-statistics from ADF regression including constant and trend, constant and without constant respectively.
3. The critical values are from MacKinnon 28 . The superscripts * and ** denotes rejection at 5 %and 1%critical values. 28 Mackinnon, Ibid. -1000
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